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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STAliE OF UTAH 
RICHARD H. HOLDER, 
Respondent, and Plaintiff, 
vs. ----
RUTH M. l10LDER, 
Appellant and Defendant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
8984 
STATE11ENT OF THE CASE 
The parties will be referred to as in the trial court. 
Plaintiff brought an action for annuhnent of a mar-
riage that took place between the parties on February 2, 
1957, on the ground that the marriage was induced solely 
by defendant's representations that she was carrying 
plaintiff's child; that said representations were fraudu-
lent and relied upon by the plaintiff and plaintiff would 
not have entered the marriage contract had it not been 
for the fraudlent representations (R.l). 
The defendant answered, denying the fraudlent rep-
resentations and counterclaimed for divorce, alimony, 
and child support (R. 4-6). The plaintiff replied to the 
counterclaim (R. 7-8). The pretrial order set forth that 
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the pleadings determined the issues (R. 18). The matter 
was tried before Judge Stewart M. Hanson on May 29, 
1958 (R. 19). 
Judge Hanson filed a memorandum decision on June 
6, 1958 (R. 106-107). Findings and Conclusions (R. 109-
111) and a Decree (R. 112), finding for. the plaintiff and 
against the defendant on the complaint and dismissing 
defendant's counterclaim as no cause of action, were filed 
on the 24th day of June, 1958. Defendant moved to alter 
the judgment and for a new trial (R. 115-116) on July 6, 
1958, and filed a notice on appeal on July 23, 1958. The 
court denied the defendant's motions to alter the judg-
ment and to grant a new trial (R. 119), and amended its 
Findings of Fact changing the date "December 25th" 
in Findings paragraphs 2, 10, 11 and 12 to read "Decem-
ber 24th" (R. 121). On December 2, 1958, defendant filed 
a second notice of appeal from the original judgment and 
for denial of the motions for new trial (R. 122). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff cannot agree with the defendant's State-
rnent of Facts, many appearing to be taken as conclusions 
and conflicting 1naterially frmn the facts found by the 
f'Ourt. Therefore, we must restate the facts. 
Several of the facts are uncontroverted, those being 
( 1) The parties were 1narried on February 2, 1957, in 
Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 22). (2) The parties had had 
no contact or access to each other between the first part 
of May, 1956, and Dece1nber 2-1-, 1956, the plaintiff having 
been jn Alaska (R. 22 and R. -!G--!7). (3) A female child 
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was born to the defendant on August 13, 1957. ( 4) The 
child was born 192 days after the marriage (computation) 
and 232 day after the first possible applicable act of in-
tercourse between the parties. ( 5) The defendant went 
to Dr. Von Holbrook on l\1arch 29, 1957 (R. 22). (6) The 
defendant had a rabbit test on January 7th, two weeks 
following her first intercourse with the plaintiff. 
Other than these facts, the statements of the parties 
and supporting witnesses vary widely. The defendant, 
an eighteen-year-old woman, testified substantially as 
follows: That she had known the plaintiff and had gone 
around with him regularly for smne time prior to May 
1956 when he went to Alaska (R. 30); that she was in 
love with the plaintiff and wanted to marry him (R. 30); 
that she did not see or have personal contact with the 
plaintiff between the first part of 11ay 1956, and Decem-
ber 24, 1956; in December of 1956 she went to 11onterey, 
California, with the plaintiff's parents for the purpose 
of meeting Richard I-Iolder who was returning from 
Alaska; the parties saw each other for the first time in 
eight months on Christmas eve and had an act of inter-
course on the beach that evening about 10:00 o'clock. 
Defendant had been to see Dr. Juel 'Trowbridge of Boun-
tiful relative to nausea and stmnach upset prior to going 
to California. Defendant testified she had her last men-
strual cycle (beginning of the flow period) on the 25th of 
November, 1956, or twenty-nine days prior to her act of 
intercourse with Richard Holder. She had her previous 
menstrual cycle on November 6th, nineteen days before 
the last she claims (R. 26). On the 25th day of December, 
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or the morning after the initial act of intercourse with the 
plaintiff, she discussed being pregnant with him (R. 27). 
On the 29th day of December, or five days after the act 
of intercourse, she told Mrs. Holder she thought she was 
pregnant. She testified that she expected the menstrual 
period on the way home from California (R. 29) and 
that would be some thirty-five days after the last men-
strual period that she claimed. 
She had a rabbit test on January 7th, taken by Dr. 
Trowbridge because because she felt nauseated on the 
way back frmn California. However, she also testified 
that she had nausea on the \Yay to California prior to 
Ineeting the plaintiff (R. 34). Her menstrual periods 
last from two to ten days (R. 31). During the month of 
January, she talked to plaintiff relative to marriage, 
saying she was carrying his baby. He told her he did not 
want to get married (R. 32-33). 
The plaintiff, Richard Holder, at the time of the 
trial was twenty-two years old, had been in ~Uaska since 
~fay of 1956, had not seen the defendant until the 24th 
of December, 1956. He had intercourse with her on that 
evening and several other tin1es on the trip. The next 
da~v after the first intercourse. or Dece1nber ~5th she 
told him she thought she was pregnant (H. -17). The first 
part of January she told hi1n she was .. pretty sure" she 
was prPgnant and ·was going to take a rabbit test (R. 48). 
I Ie told her fr01n the beginning that he did not think the 
child was his and that he did not want to 1narry her (R. 
49). He 1narried her only due to her representations that 
RlH' was earr)ring his child. Defendant left for Alaska on 
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May 4, 1957, and has had no relationship with the defend-
ant since that time. Defendant never told the plaintiff 
that Dr. Holbrook estimated that the baby would arrive 
in the middle of August. 
The plaintiff's father testified that he picked the 
defendant up at her home in Bountiful to start the trip 
to Monterey, and at the time he picked her up she told 
him that she had told her mother she was going to be 
pregnant when she came back from California. Defendant 
denied this conversation (R. 39). The plaintiff's mother 
testified that the defendant first informed her that she 
was pregnant early in January and that Ruth s1aw her 
close to a dozen times at the store and at the house, 
complaining that Dick did not want to marry her and ask-
ing her to prevail upon Dick to marry her (R. 71-72). 
She further testified that after the baby was born, she 
had a conversation vvith the defendant wherein she told 
the witness that she had her }ast menstrual period the 
first part of November (R. 74). She ralso stated that the 
defendant told her that she had been to see Dr. Trow-
bridge concerning flu and nausea prior to the trip to 
California, and that the doctor thought she was pregnant. 
She did not mention the doctor by name but the earlier 
conversation related to Dr. Trowbridge (R. 75). After 
the witness' husband had informed her that the defendant 
had told him she had told her mother she was coming 
back from California pregnant, ~Irs. IIolder told the 
defendant "you should not figure on taking the trip with 
us and coming back in that condition. It wouldn't look 
very nice on us" (R. 76). 
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Dr. Von Holbrook testified that he was a surgeon 
specializing in obstetrics and gynecology and has been 
for sixteen years (R. 52), and that defendant consulted 
him in relation to a pregiliancy on the 29th of March at 
his office, and that he found her to be pregnant (R. 52). 
According to the menstrual history she gave him she 
should have been three months pregnant, but from his 
physical examination it appeared to him that she was 
further along. He could hear the fetel heartbeat on the 
first visit which normally comes about four months. It 
is extremely rare at three and one-half months and only 
occasional at three and three-quarters months (R. 53). 
There are times during his sixteen years of practice when 
he may have heard a fetel heartbeat at three and one-half 
months but it usually turned out that the person was fur-
ther along in her pregnancy than expected from her 
menstrual history (R. 54). The size of the uterus was 
compatible with a four-month preglllancy (R. 54). It is 
not probable that conception in this case took place as 
late as December 25th (R. 55). He testified it is possible 
that conception took place as late as that date if you 
1nean one chance in 10,000 (R. 57). The Doctor delivered 
the defendant's child and testified it was not probable 
that the child was as much ·as six weeks short of "term". 
He also testified there was no way that a woman could 
tell she was pregnant one day after intercourse or within 
seven days after intercourse (R. 58), and that any nausea 
or morning sickness within a week after intercourse 
would be purely psychological; that it is possible that a 
Freeman test or a rabbit test could show pregnancy on 
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the 7th day of J·anuary when conception occurred on the 
24th day of December, but not probable (R. 65). 
Dr. Horne, testifying for the defendant, testified 
that normally he could first detect the fetel heartbeat at 
sixteen to twenty weeks. He said that in some women 
it was easier to detect the fetel heartbeat than in others 
due to their size and physical condition and that, gener-
ally speaking, babies weigh less than the defendant's 
baby if born six weeks before time. He testified that the 
formula for determining the probable date of birth for a 
child is by taking the date of the starting of the woman's 
last menstrual period, adding seven days, and then 
going back three months. The defendant on direct exam-
ination in the defendant's case testified as to necessary 
living expenses in the event a divorce was granted and 
expressly denied making the statements as to becoming 
pregnant and as to the date of the first of November 
menstrual cycle testified to by the parents of the plain-
tiff. 
STATE~1ENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE CHILD WAS A "FULL TERM" OR "NEAR TERM" 
BABY AND OOULD NO'T HAVE BEEN CONCEIVED AS 
LATE AS DECEMBER 24, 1956. 
POINT II 
COVERING POINTS II AND III OF APPELLANT'S 
BRIEF. THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
THE COURT'S FINDINGS THAT DEFENDANT HAD SPOK-
EN 'TO PLAINTIFF'S FATHER REGARDING BEING PREG-
NANT ON RETURN FROM CALIFORNIA, AND DISCUSSED 
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WITH PLAINTIFF'S MOTHER MISSING THE MENSTRUAL 
PERIOD PRIOR TO GOING TO CALIFORNIA. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE IS CONCLUSIVE THAT DEFENDANT 
MUST HAVE BEEN PREGNANT ON DECEMBER 24, 1956. 
POINT IV 
THE .COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFEND-
ANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. 
ARGU1fENT 
POINT I 
THE CHILD WAS A "FULL TERM" OR "NEAR TERM" 
BABY AND ·COULD NO'T HAVE BEEN CONCEIVED AS 
LATE AS DECEMBER 24, 1956. 
The child in question was a "full" or "near te11.11~' 
baby. There is little difference in the testin1ony of the 
two doctors in the cJase when read as a whole. Dr. Hol-
brook, who delivered the baby, estimated as early as 
l\1:arch 29, 1957, that the child would be born about the 
1niddle of August. This calculation was 1nade from physi-
cal findings which did not concur ·with the 1nenstrual 
history given him by the defendant. The child \Yas born 
on the 13th day of August, 1957. The defendant never 
informed the plaintiff of Dr. Holbrook's eS'ti1nated tin1e 
of birth. 
The defendant testified that she had had her next to 
last 1nenstrual period prior to birth of the child on the 
Gth of N ovmnber, 1956. Applying the fonnula of Dr. 
Horne who was the defendant's mn1 witness, taking the 
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date of the starting of the last menstrual cycle (assuming 
for purposes of computation that the last menstrual 
cycle began November 6, 1956), and adding seven days 
and then counting back three months, we find that the 
baby would have been expected on exactly the day it was 
born. This, combined with Dr. Holbrook's physical find-
ings at all stages of the pregnancy, his estimate of the 
probable birth date, the defendant's own testimony as to 
nausea prior to arriving in California, the improbability 
of an affirmative or positive showing on a Freeman or 
rabbit test with two weeks after conception, 1and the 
conflicting tesrtimony as to the statements against inter-
est made by the defendant (a) to plaintiff's father 
concerning her determination to be pregnant when she 
came back from Oalifornia, and (b) her statements to 
plaintiff's mother that she had contacted Dr. Trowbridge 
prior to the California trip with relation to flu and miss-
ing a menstrual cycle, :all fit together to indicate the child 
was a "full" or "near term" child. 
POINT II 
COVERING POINTS II AND III OF APPELLANT'S 
BRIEF. THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
THE COURT'S FINDINGS THAT DEFENDANT HAD SPOK-
EN 'TO PLAINTIFF'S FATHER REGARDING BEING PREG-
NANT ON RETURN FROM CALIFORNIA, AND DISCUSSED 
WITH PLAINTIFF'S MOTHER MISSING THE MENSTRUAL 
PERIOD PRIOR TO GOING TO CALIFORNIA. 
The defendant puts great weight on (a) the argu-
ment on statements to the plaintiff's parents regarding 
her determination to become pregnant and her admission 
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after the baby was born to the plaintiff's mother thrut she 
had contacted Dr. Trowbridge were improbable and be-
yond human belief, and (b) that the defendant offered 
to waive her doctor-patient privilege if plaintiff wanted 
to call in Dr. Trowbridge. 
With respect to (a) above, it is true there is a con-
flict in testimony, the plaintiff's father claiming defend-
ant made the statement as to beng pregnant when she 
returned from California when he picked her up in Boun-
tiful at the start of the trip. 'This the defendant denies i 
However, Mrs. Holder confirms the statement as to 
pregnancy with regard to a conversation with the de-
fendant at R. 76. The record is filled with evidence that 
the defendant began to claiin she was pregnant on the 
25th of December, less than twenty-four hours after the 
initial act of intercourse, and continued to make the claim 
until the time of marriage. The court, who had the op-
portunity to see the witnesses, evaluate the incredibility, 
candor, and demeanor, found that defendant had made 
sueh 1a statement. This cotu·t has continually held that 
the opinion and findings of the trial judge 1nust be given 
great weight due to his personal contact with the witness 
and opportunity to obseiTe and judge frmn state1nent~ 
heard from the witness' Inouth rather than fr01n the 
written reeord. 
Under the sanw reasoning, Judge Hanson was in a 
more ·advantnp;eous position to detennine the credibility 
and veraeity of the witnesses than is this court from 
the written record. 
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With respect to (b) above, the defendant denies 
that she had a conversation with Mrs. Holder concerning 
her visit to Dr. Trowbridge prior to the trip to California. 
However, in her testimony defendant admits contacting 
Dr. Trowbridge prior to the trip, but claims it was merely 
with respect to :advice as to tre,atment of the flu. It is in-
teresting to note that had there not been conversation 
with Mrs. Holder respecting a visit to Dr. Trowbridge, 
she would have had no way of knowing or finding out 
about the visit to which she testified. 
In his brief, denfendant's counsel stresses an affi-
davit signed by one Juel E. Trowbridge, M.D. (R. 117). 
Such affidavit was not presented for admission ~at the 
trial and is hearsay without opportunity cross examine, 
and has apparently been altered since being made with 
the alterations being uninitialed. 
We ~also point out that defendant's counsel in his 
brief stresses his offer to have defendant waive any 
doctor-patient privileges between defendant and Dr. 
Trowbridge if the plaintiff wish to call Dr. Trowbridge 
in the matter. It would seem that Dr. Trowbridge's testi-
mony might well have been proper rebuttal had the de-
fendant chosen to call the doctor as a witness, which 
she did not. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE IS CONCLUSIVE 'THAT DEFENDANT 
MUST HAVE BEEN PREGNANT ON DECEMBER 24, 1956. 
As discussed in Point I, the child Debbie Holder 
was born on August 13, 1957, 192 days after the marriage 
of the parties herein :and a maximum of 232 day after 
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intercourse between the parties. We are aware of the 
presumption as to legitimacy of a child born in wedlock, 
but feel that said presumption does not apply here. See 
Gonzales vs. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 202 P ( 2d) 135. 
As discussed in that case, it cites Estate of J\1cN amara, 
183 Pac. 552, 7 A.L.R. 313 : 
"The conclusive presmuption cannot be ap-
plied to such extreme and exceptioinal cases." 
Citing from Murr v. Murr, 197 P. (2d) 369, where we 
have as in this case a child born only slightly over six 
months 'after the marriage was consummated, the ap-
pellate court reversed the trial court which applied the 
conclusive presumption. The appellate court held that 
under the circumstances, the presumption was rebuttable: 
" 'A mature child having been born after an 
alleged gestation period of six months and ten 
days, which period according to authoritative 
medical opinion ''""as about one month shorter than 
the shortest (known) period of gestation for such 
a birth, and the birth certificate being prima facie 
evidence that it was a nine-months 'pregnancy~ 
was only rebuttable.'' 
In Dazey vs. Dazey et al., 122 P(:?d) 308, the Cali-
fornia court again holds that where there is an extre1nely 
long period of gt>station, that is longer than usual or 
normal, the presumption is not applicable. Citing the 
eas<' of l\1 <' N mn~u'~a, supra. and ~--\.nderson vs. AEderson. 
5 P(2d) SSl, tlw court agnin holds that w-hen a short 
period of gPstation is not within the usual or normal 
p('riod of gPstation the presmuption does not apply. In 
th<' instant rase. besides the tstin1ony of the attending 
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physician, Dr. Holbrook, that on the first visit he esti-
mated the pregnancy was in its fourth month from the 
physical findings, which differed from the menstrual 
history given by defendant, and in applying the formula 
given by defendant's witness, Dr. Horne, to the defend-
ant of the defendant's admitted n1enstrual period on 
November 6th, we arrive at the exact date the baby was 
born. Dr. Holbrook estimated the time of birth as the mid-
dle of August, and his estimate was within two days of 
the actual time of birth. When those facts are considered 
with statements of the defendant to the plaintiff's par-
ents, and with her admission to ~irs. Holder after the 
baby was born that she had contacted a doctor relative 
to a missed menstrual cycle prior to leaving for Cali-
fornia in the latter part of December, combined with her 
statements that she thought she was pregnant on Decem-
ber 25th, it would appear that defendant knew she was 
pregnant and was concealing the fact to set up a marriage 
with plaintiff, coerced by her statements that she was 
bearing his child. When we consider further that she 
failed to tell the plaintiff of Dr. Holbrook's estimated 
time of arrival of the child in August, and her insistence 
on taking a Freeman or rabbit test immediately upon 
return from California, the evidence becomes even more 
conclusive. We must also consider Dr. Holbrook's testi-
mony that it was possible but highly improbable that a 
JTreeman test would give a positive result within that 
short a period after possible conception. The defendant 
also admitted on the stand that she had been nauseated 
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on the way to Oalifornia before any act of intercourse 
with the plaintiff. 
Considering the testimony as a whole and this court's 
duty to give weight to the opportunity of the trial judge 
to observe the witnesses firsthand, it would appear that 
the evidence is overwhelming that the defendant was 
pregnant prior to the December 24th act of intercourse 
with the plaintiff, that she concealed that pregnancy, 
represented to him that she was carrying his child, pre-
vailed upon his parents thereon and fraudulently induced 
a marriage which would not have taken plaee otherwise. 
POINT IV 
THE ·COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFEND-
ANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. 
In view of the findings and the weight of the evi-
dence, the court did not err in denying defendant a ne\Y 
trial. All that was brought forth at the ti1ne of ne\Y trial 
was an affidavit signed by Juel E. Trowbridge, whose 
testimony could have been proper rebuttal to the plain-
tiff's case had he been produced and been allmYed to lw 
cross exan1ined. 
The court did mnend several of the findings, correct-
ing the date of initial intereourse frmn Deeen1ber 2~. 
1956, to Dece1nher 24, 1956. Such an1endment to conform 
to the evidence waR entirely proper. 
SlJ~L\!AHY 
It ·appearing from the ease of Bem~nt Y~. Bement. 
110 Utah -1-51, 17-+ P(2d) 996, that n1isrepresentation by a 
\\'nuum to indnr.<J a marriag·e, stating that she was preg-
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nant by the person induced when as 'a Inatter of fact she 
vvas pregnant by some other person, is a ground for an-
nulment for fraudulent misrepresentation, which the bur-
den being on the plaintiff to sustain his burden of evi-
dence, and proof in the instant case being conclusive that 
the ehild born August 13, 1957, was not the child of the 
plaintiff Richard Holder, and there being ample evidence 
to support the trial court's finding that the child was not 
fathered hy the plajntiff, ;ve contend that this court 
should affinn the lower court's decree granting an an-
nulment. 
Respectfully subinitted, 
RAYS. :McCARTY and 
SUMNER J. HATCH 
Attorneys for Respondent and 
PlaiJntiff 
409 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
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